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EVERARDO GAliCIA et
Petitioners, v. INDUSTRIAL
ACCIDENT COMMISSION et al., Respondents.
[1]

purpose in
providing
period and
under circumstances not covered by workmen's compensation
was not to create duplicating compensations but was to provide an insurance prog-ram to pay benefits to individuals who
are unemployed hecause of illness or injury for which no compcnsa tion is otherwise made.
[2] Id.-Purpose.-Legi.slative intention that a workman shall be
compensated in part for wag·e loss resulting from unemployment due to sickness or injury both where disability is industrially caused (covered by vV orkmen's Compensation Act)
and where it is not so caused (covered by Unemployment
Insurance Act), but that he shall not be entitled to unemployment compensation disability benefits in addition to 1vorkmen's
compensation for same period of unemployment, is manifest
in substance of respective statutes. (See vVorkmen's Compensation Act, Lab. Code, §§ 3202, 3208, 4903, par. (f), §§ 50005003, 5100; Unemployment Insurance Act, 3 Deering's Gen.
Laws, Act 8780d, §§ 150, 207.)
[3] Workmen's Compensation-Liens on Award.-To make effective legislative intention that workman shall not be entitled
to unemployment compensation disability benefits in addition
to workmen's compensation for same period of unemployment,
the Industrial Aecident Commission, pursuant to Lab. Code,
§ 4903, par. (f), must allow a lien against workmen's compensation for unemployment compensation disability benefits
paid under Unemployment Insurance Act during a period
when, pending determination by Industrial Accident Commission of a claim for workmen's compensation, there was
uncertainty whether benefits were payable under Workmen's
Compensation Act or under Unemployment Insurance Act.
[ 4] !d.-Construction: Unemployment Insurance-Construction of
Statutes.-Both \Vorkmen's Compensation Act and Unemploy[1] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1950 Rev.), Unemployment Relief-Insurance Act, § 3.
[3] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 197 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Unemployment Insurance, § 2;
[3, 5, 8] Workmen's Compensation, § 197; [4] vVorkmen's Compensation, § 9; Unemployment Insurance, § 3; [6] Workmen's
Compensation, § 126; [7] Evidence, § 152.
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ment Insurance Act are remedial statutes and are to be
liberally construed for purpose of accomplishing their objects.
!d.-Liens on Award.-An agreement compromising a claim
for compensation entered into between injured workman and
workmen's compensation insurance carrier of his employer
and approved by commission is workmen's compensation
against which lien for unemployment disability benefits should
be allowed.
!d.-Authority of Commission.-Final determinations whether
an employe is entitled to workmen's compensation, amount
of such compensation and period during which he is eligible
therefor must be made by Industrial Accident Commission.
Evidence-Burden of Proof-Party on Whom Burden Lies.While ordinarily burden of proving every element of a claim
is on one who asserts it, for practical reasons burden of explanation or of going forward with evidence is sometimes
placed on a party-opponent who has information lacking to
one who asserts and seeks to establish a fact.
Workmen's Compensation-Liens on Award.-Where an agreement between injured employe and employer's insurance
carrier compromising a claim for compensation has been approved by Industrial Accident Commission and it was stipulated that Department of Employment paid unemployment
disability benefits for a certain period within the period
covered by the claim for compensation, this is sufficient to
show prima facie as against such employe and insurance
carrier, in absence of evidence presumptively within their
power to produce, that department's payments were for a
period when employe was industrially disabled and that a
fund existed against which a lien for such payments could
and should attach; if there be any further showing as to
nature and period of disability, it should come from employe
or insurance carrier.

PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial Accident Commission granting lien. Award affirmed.
Victor C. Rose, Eugene Marias, Herlihy & Herlihy and
E. H. Herlihy for Petitioners.
Edmund J. Thomas, Jr., T. Groezinger, Everett A. Corten,
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Irving H. Perluss,
Assistant Attorney General, William L. Shaw and Vincent
P. Lafferty, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondents.
[7] See Cal.Jur., Evidence, § 91 et seq.; Am.Jur., Evidence,
§ 135 et seq.
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SCHAUER, J.-Everardo Garcia, an applicant for workmen's compensation, and Pacific Indemnity Company, carrier
of the workmen's compensation insurance of Garcia's employer, seek review of an Industrial Accident Commission
award of a lien (allowed pursuant to Lab. Code, § 4903,
par. (f)) against $1,250 payable to Garcia under an
agreement between him and Pacific compromising his claim
for workmen's compensation. The lien claimant is the Department of Employment of the State of California. It
paid the employe unemployment compensation disability
benefits during a period when, although it is not disputed
that he was entitled to compensation from one source or the
other, it was uncertain whether the benefits sh<mld be paid,
on the one hand, under the Unemployment Insurance Act,
or, on the other hand, under the \rv orkmen 's Compensation
Act. rrhe subsequent compromise of the employe's claim for
workmen's compensation was approved by the commission.
There was no direct evidence before the commission as to
whether the injury on account of which the employe claimed
workmen's compensation was industrially caused and as to
whether, if it was, it caused the disability during the period
for which unemployment compensation disability benefits
were paid. The employe and the workmen's compensation
insurance carrier of the employer take the position that there
was no evidence before the commission sufficient to support
a finding on those matters, and that the Department of
Employment, to establish its lien, must prove such matters.
The commission and the department take the position that
the employe and the insurance carrier, if they object to
allowance of the lien, must show that it should be disallowed.
We have concluded that the position of the commission and
the department is correct.
On August 3, 1950, the employe filed with the commission
his application for adjustment of claim for an allegedly industrial injury which was sustained March 17, 1950. Also
on August 3d the Department of Employment filed its request
for allowance of lien on which was endorsed the employe's
consent to such allowance. The department paid the employe unemployment compensation totaling $496 during the
period from June 27 through October 16, 1950.
Hearings on the claim before the commission were continued from time to time because the employe and the employer's insurance carrier were negotiating for a settlement.
In March, 1952, the employe and the insurance carrier ex-
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ecuted a settlement agreement which recited that there was
a dispute as to liability and compromised the employe's claims
against the compensation insurance carrier for the sum of
$1,250. The commission approved this settlement by an order
which made no mention of the department's lien claim.
At the department's request the matter was reopened for
consideration of the lien claim in the light of this court's
decision in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1952),
38 Cal.2d 599 [244 P.2d 530], which decision became final
after the commission had approved the settlement. At the
hearing concerning the lien all the parties declined to introduce evidence on the question whether, during the period
when the department paid the unemployment disability benefits, the employe was disabled by an industrial injury. The
referee found that ''there is no evidence to establish that
applicant [employe] has sustained any injury which arose
out of and occurred in the course of his employment or that
he suffered any period of disability as result of any such
injury, nor is there any evidence that will establish that he
is entitled to any compensation by reason of any such period
of disability.'' However, it is not disputed that, as above
recited, the claim for workmen's compensation was filed,
such claim was compromised, and the compromise was approved by the commission. Upon the record the referee
recommended and the commission ordered that the lien be
granted. The employe and the employer's insurance carrier
exhausted their remedies before the commission, and this
review proceeding followed.
[1] In Bryant v. Industr1'al .Aec. Com. (1951), 37 Cal.
2d 215, 218 [231 P.2d 32], we emphasized that the legislative purpose in providing unemployment disability benefits
for periods and under circumstances not covered by workmen's compensation obviously -vvas not to create duplicating
compensations but, rather (in the language of the report of
the Senate Interim Committee on Unemployment Insurance,
Senate Journal, May 7, 1945, p. 126), was to provide an
insurance program "to pay benefits to individuals who are
unemployed because of illness or injury for which no compensation is otherwise made." (Italics added.) [2] The
legislative intention that a workman shall be compensated in
part for the wage loss resulting from unemployment due to
sickness or injury both where the elisa bility is industrially
caused (covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act) and
where it is not so caused (covered by the Unemployment
Insurance Act), but that he shall not be entitled to unem-
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ployment compensation disability benefits in addition to
workmen's compensation for the same period of unemployment, is manifest in the substance of the respective statutes.
(See, e.g., "\Vorkmen 's Compensation Act, Lab. Code, §§ 3202,
3208, 4903, par. (f), §§ 5000-5003, 5100; Unemployment Insurance Act, 3 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 8780d, §§ 150, 207.)
[3] In the Bryant case we further held that, to make the
legislative intention effeetive, the Industrial Accident Commission, pursuant to paragraph (£) of section 4903 of the
Labor Code, must allow a lien against workmen's compensation for unemployment compensation disability benefits paid
under the Unemployment Insurance Act during a period
when, pending a determination by the Industrial Accident
Commission of a claim for workmen's compensation, there
was uncertainty whether benefits were payable under the
\Vorkmen 's Compensation Act or under the Unemployment
Insurance Act.
[4] Both the Workmen's Compensation Act and the Unemployment Insurance Act are remedial statutes and are
to be liberally construed for the purpose of accomplishing
their objects. Obviously, a primary and common object is
the prompt cash assistance of a disabled workman. To that
end, the immediate payment of benefits under the Unemploym('nt Insurance Act where there is a question whether
benefits are payable under the workmen's compensation law,
is highly desirable. In the Aetna case (Aetna Life Ins. Co.
v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1952), supra, 38 Cal.2d 599, 603)
we recognized that the proper conduct of the business of
an insurance company carrying unemployment compensation
disability benefit insurance would inevitably tend to make
it delay payments to the workman in doubtful cases pending
determination of the question as to whether the disability
was compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act,
unless such carrier could be assured that payments advanced
under such circumstances would in all proper cases be recoverable upon determination of the controlling facts. [5] We
specifically held (p. 604 of 38 Cal.2d) that an amount payable
under an agreement compromising a claim for compensation
entered into between the injured workman and the workmen's compensation insurance carrier of his employer and
approved by the commission was workmen's compensation
against which the lien for unemployment disability benefits
should be allowed.
[6] The final determinations whether an employe is en-
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titled to workmen's compensation, the amount of such compensation and the period during which he is eligible therefor,
must be made by the Industrial Accident Commission. In
the Aetna case the commission had nbt made such determinations. This court (p. 605 of 38 Cal.2d.) directed that
"if the parties, including Aetna [the unemployment insurance carrier which claimed a lien there], cannot work out
an agreement which effects a settlement of Aetna's claim,
then the Industrial Accident Commission should determine
the period of disability for which the employe is entitled
to compensation and allow the claimed lien for the amounts
of unemployment disability benefits paid during that period."
As stated above, it is the position of the commission and
the department that the lien claimant is not required to produce evidence on which the commission can find that "the
employee is entitled to compensation.'' The department and
the commission point out that there is great practical difficulty in requiring the department to produce evidence of
the industrial nature of the employe's injury and the period
of his disability at a time long after the alleged injury and
disability, where the employe who has first hand knowledge
of those matters and the insurance carrier who has immediate
opportunity to investigate them decline to produce such
evidence and instead elect to compromise. [7] Ordinarily,
as the employe and the insurance carrier argue, the burden
of proving every element of a claim is on the one who asserts
it. But for practical reasons the burden of explanation or
of going forward with the evidence is sometimes placed on a
party-opponent who has information lacking to the one who
asserts and seeks to establish a fact. Familiar examples of
this procedural device are the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
(see, e.g., Ybarra v. Spangard (1944), 25 Cal.2d 486, 490
[154 P.2d 687, 162 A.L.R. 1258] ; Dierman v. Providence
Hospital (1947), 31 Cal.2d 290, 294 [188 P.2d 12]) and the
use of special presumptions against a defendant in a criminal
case where there is a rational connection between a fact
proved by the prosecution and a presumed fact which can
best be explained by the defendant (see, e.g., People v. Scott
(1944), 24 Cal.2d 774, 779 [151 P.2d 517] ).
[8] Here, it appears from the employe's application for
adjustment of claim for workmen's compensation that he
claimed an industrial injury which resulted in his leaving
work on June 16, 1950; it was agreed between the employe
and the workmen's compensation insurance carrier that the
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employe was away from work until November, 1950; the
employe's claim was compromised for a substantial sum,
which compromise was approved by the commission; and it
was stipulated that the department paid unemployment disability benefits from ,June 27, 1950, to October 16, 1950.
This is sufficient to show prima faci.e, as against the employe
who made the claim and his employer's workmen's compensation insurance carrier, in the absence of evidence presumptively within their power to produce, that the department's payments were for a period when the employe was
industrially disabled, and that a fund existed against which
the lien could and should attach. If there was to be any
further showing as to the nature and period of the disability
it should have come from the employe or the insurance
carrier.
For the reasons above stated the award is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.
EDMONDS, J.-I concur in the judgment for the reason
that the record shows a claim for an industrial injury alleged
to have occurred prior to the period during which Garcia
received unemployment compensation disability benefits and
an approved compromise of that claim. In such circumstances,
the Industrial Accident Commission properly might infer that
the disability was work connected and determine that the Department of Employment had established a prima facie case
for the amount of its claim.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
I reiterate the views expressed in my dissents in Bryant v.
Industrial Ace. Com., 37 Cal.2d 215, 223 [231 P.2d 32], and
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. lndustTial Ace. Com., 38 Cal.2d 599,
605 [241 P .2d 530]. In the latter case the majority held
that a lien for unemployment disability payments must be
allowed against the sum a workman was to receive for an
injury under a compromise with his employer's insurance
carrier. The present case goes one step further and holds
that the employee has the burden of proving that the compromised claim was not compensable under the workmen's
compensation laws even though it is the payor of the disability payments who is asserting the lien, and for him to
be entitled to it, the disability must have been compensable
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under the workmen's compensation laws. This is squarely
contrary to section 5705 of the Labor Code, dealing with
workmen's compensation, which provides that: ''The burden
of proof rests upon the party holding the affirmative of the
issue." (See, also, Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1981, 1869.) Hence
the lien claimant had the burden of proving that the compromise payment was for an injury compensable under the
workmen's compensation laws. To escape that proposition
the majority reasons that the burden should be on the employee because he is better able to sustain it. While that
may be true to some extent, the testimony of the employer
and his employees and the data gathered as the result of
any investigation made by the employer's insurance carrier
are available equally to the lien claimant and the employee.
It would seem to follow, therefore, that with reference to
that source of evidence the employee is in no better position
than the lien claimant. In any event it would seem that
at least some burden rested upon the lien claimant to make
a prima facie showing that the employee was in a position
to produce evidence relating to the injury which was not
available to the lien claimant. No such showing was made.
In this state of the record, reliance by the majority upon
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur seems rather farfetched.
In brief, we have here merely the assertion of a claim for
workmen's compensation benefits by the employee, which
claim was not pressed because of the compromise. We also
have the assertion of a lien by the Department of Employment against the amount of the compromise. At this point
the employee is claiming nothing with respect to compensation, but the majority says that the burden is on him to
disprove that his injury was employment connected or a
lien will attach. Of course, the majority would not hold
that the mere assertion of a claim for workmen's compensation by an employee creates a presumption of its validity,
as such holding would place an undue burden upon the
employer and his insurance carrier. Yet the effect of the
majority holding in the case at bar is to create such a presumption. But it is created for the purpose of defeating
rather than supporting the claim of the employee. Thus a
law which was designed to protect the interests of injured
employees is construed to defeat their interests.
The majority also advances the specious argument that
unless every claim of lien for disability benefits is allowed
against awards for workmen's compensation the payment of
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disability benefits will be delayed to the detriment of the
injured employees. Why this result would obtain is not
apparent. The statute defining who is entitled to disability
benefits is clear (Deering's Gen. Laws, 1949 Supp., Act
8780d, §§ 201, 205, 206.1, 207, 208). The provisions for
payment of such benefits are also clear (Deering's Gen. Laws,
1949 Supp., supra, Act 8780d, §§ 250-254). With respect
to the purpose of the act, section 150 thereof provides: ''The
purpose of this article is to compensate in part for the wage
loss sustained by individuals unemployed because of sickness
or injury and to reduce to a minimum the suffering caused
by unemployment resulting therefrom. This article shall be
construed liberally in aid of its declared purpose to mitigate
the evils and burdens which fall on the ~tnemployed and
disabled worker and his family." (Emphasis added.) '!.'he
majority would thwart this salutary purpose by suggesting
to those responsible for the payment of unemployment compensation disability benefits that payment of such benefits be
delayed in cases where workmen's compensation is also claimed
by the employee until the validity of such claim is determined. In refutation of this argument I venture to suggest
that if such a practice should be pursued by those responsible for the payment of such benefits, the Legislature would
provide an appropriate penalty designed to correct such an
evil. However, as I read the act, I can see no basis for the
unwarranted suggestion contained in the majority opinion.
Because there is no evidence on which a valid lien could
be imposed on the amount covered by the compromise, I
would annul the award.
Petitioner's application for a rehearing· was denied December 10, 1953. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the
petition should be granted.

